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Abstract
Given the option, humans and other animals elect to distribute their time between work and leisure, rather than choosing
all of one and none of the other. Traditional accounts of partial allocation have characterised behavior on a macroscopic
timescale, reporting and studying the mean times spent in work or leisure. However, averaging over the more microscopic
processes that govern choices is known to pose tricky theoretical problems, and also eschews any possibility of direct
contact with the neural computations involved. We develop a microscopic framework, formalized as a semi-Markov decision
process with possibly stochastic choices, in which subjects approximately maximise their expected returns by making
momentary commitments to one or other activity. We show macroscopic utilities that arise from microscopic ones, and
demonstrate how facets such as imperfect substitutability can arise in a more straightforward microscopic manner.
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Introduction
When suitably free, humans and other animals divide their
limited time between work, i.e., performing employer-defined tasks
remunerated by rewards such as money or food, and leisure, i.e.,
activities pursued for themselves that appear to confer intrinsic
benefit. The division of time provides insights into these quantities
and their interaction, and has been addressed by both microeco-
nomics and behavioral psychology.
Microeconomic labor supply theorists [1] have adopted a
normative perspective, formulating what a rational agent should
do. Accounts from behavioral psychology have been descriptive,
detailing how subjects allocate their time, for example, propor-
tionally to the relative payoffs from work and leisure [2–8].
Common to these approaches is the coarse, macroscopic timescale
at which behavior is characterised, focusing on average times spent
in work and leisure. By contrast, microscopic analyses characterise
the fine temporal topography of work and leisure choices, and so
offer a foundation for examining, rather than averaging away, rich
psychological and neural processes. Tying microscopic and
macroscopic choices together is known to be difficult in general
[9], because the former involves a much more elaborate state
space than the latter.
Here, we build an approximately optimal stochastic control
theoretic model of decision-making at a microscopic level. We
show how averaging over the microscopic choices yields a
characterizable superset of traditional macroscopic theories, and
casts the assumptions necessary for the latter to capture partial
allocation in a different light. We make the novel prediction that
partial allocation requires neither stochastic choices (as generally
assumed by accounts from behavioral psychology) nor the
marginal utility of leisure to depend on the amount of work
performed. We use a simplification of a particularly stark labor
task as a paradigm example to show how macroscopic and
microscopic theories of the partial allocation of time between work
and leisure can be tied. We therefore do not attempt to model
actual data from this task; a qualitative account is available in [10].
Results
Task and experiment
We consider a Cumulative Handling Time task [11,12] in
which subjects must accumulate work up to a total time-period
called the price P (see Table 1 for a list of symbols and their
meanings) to gain a reward. The price and the objective strength
of the reward are defined by the experimenter. Note that the price
is an experimenter determined time-period, hence we shall use
‘‘long’’ and ‘‘short’’ to denote its duration. Subjects are free to
distribute leisure bouts in between work bouts (Fig.S1A). The
CHT controls both the (average) minimum inter-reward interval
and the amount of work required to earn a reward. This makes the
CHT a generalisation of common schedules of reinforcement such
as Fixed Ratio, or Variable Interval, which control one but not the
other.
Reward and leisure are both assumed to enjoy a subjective
worth. We call these microscopic utilities to distinguish them from
the macroscopic utilities used by traditional theories. The
microscopic utility of the former is called the (subjective) reward
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intensity (RI , in arbitrary units); the ratio of this to the price is
called the payoff (or in economic nomenclature, wage rate)
RW~
RI
P
. For simplicity, we consider the objective price,
recognising that its subjective value may differ. We explore
different functional forms for the presumed microscopic utility of
leisure.
This paradigm was originally developed in the context of rats
pressing down an unweighted lever to gain non-satiating, brain
stimulation reward (BSR), or alternatively choosing leisure in the
form of resting, grooming, exploring, etc. However, as noted
above, we do not model data, but rather consider an abstracted
version of the task in order to concentrate on the relationship
between microscopic and macroscopic descriptions.
Macroscopic and microscopic analyses
The key macroscopic statistic is the Time Allocation (TA): the
proportion of trial time that the subject spends working [2].
Fig.S1B shows example TAs for a typical subject. As expected, the
TA increases with reward intensity and decreases with price. A
microscopic analysis, as shown by ethograms in (Fig.S1C),
considers the detailed temporal topography of choice, recording
when and for how long each act of work or leisure occurred. Note
that at intermediate payoffs, when partial allocation is most
noticeable, subjects consume almost all leisure immediately after
Table 1. List of symbols.
Symbol Meaning
b[½0,?) inverse temperature or degree of stochasticity-determinism parameter
CL(
:) microscopic utility of leisure
Ep expected value with respect to policy p
H(p) entropy
KL marginal utility of linear microscopic utility of leisure
L leisure
l cumulative amount of time spent in leisure
N total number of rewards accrued
P Price
PL price at which TA~0:5, for a maximum subjective reward intensity RImax
p(½a,taDS) policy or choice rule: probability of choosing action a, for duration ta from state S
post post-reward
pre pre-reward
Q(S,½a,ta) expected return or (differential) Q-value of taking action a, for duration ta from state
S
r reward rate
rta average foregone reward for taking action a for duration ta
RI (subjective) Reward Intensity
RImax maximum (subjective) Reward Intensity
RW~
RI
P
payoff
s degree of substitutability between rewards (or work) and leisure
S state
T trial duration
TA Time Allocation
tL duration of leisure
tW duration of work
v cumulative amount of time spent in work
W work
V (S) expected return or value of state S
U macroscopic utility
Author Summary
Dividing limited time between work and leisure when both
are attractive is a common everyday decision. Rather than
doing one exclusively, humans and other animals distrib-
ute their time between both. Traditional explanations of
this phenomenon have studied the macroscopic average
times spent in both. By contrast, we develop a microscopic
framework in which we can model the real-time decisions
that underpin these averages. In the framework, subjects’
choices are approximately optimal, according to a natural,
microscopic, utility function. We show that the assump-
tions of previous theories are not necessary for partial
allocation to be optimal, and show possibilities and limits
to the integration of macroscopic and microscopic views.
Our approach opens new vistas onto the real-time
processes underlying cost-benefit decision-making.
Some Work and Some Play
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getting a reward, and then work continuously for each entire price
[13].
Traditional macroscopic accounts: I
Microeconomics: Labor supply theory. In labor supply
theory [1], subjects are assumed to maximize their macroscopic
utility by trading (i) income from working (worth RI per reward),
against (ii) leisure (worth, in the simplest case, a marginal utility of
KL per unit time). Let N be the total number of rewards that a
subject accumulates, and l be the cumulative amount of time spent
in leisure. A commonly assumed form of macroscopic utility
function is [14,15].
U(l, N)~(KLl
szRI Ns)1=s ð1Þ
where s[({?,1 is a dimensionless number representing the
degree of substitutability, the willingness to replace rewards (or work)
with leisure. Fig.1 shows the indifference curves (IC)–contours of
equal utility. A subject is indifferent between combinations of these
goods along an IC, but combinations on an IC with greater utility
are preferred. The slope of an IC, the negative of which is called the
marginal rate of substitution, shows how willing a subject is to
substitute one good with the other, depending on howmuch of each
it has already accumulated. Given a fixed total trial time (a budget
constraint; BC Eq. (A-1) in Text S1), subjects must maximise their
macroscopic utilities; this occurs for the combination of goods at
which the BC is tangent to an IC or is at a boundary.
Work and leisure are perfect substitutes (s~1 in Eq. (1)) for
subjects who are willing to substitute work for leisure at the same
rate, irrespective of the amount of either already consumed. The
ICs become (negatively sloped) straight lines. The optimum
allocation is then at the boundary with all work (if returns from
work exceed those from leisure, i.e. RIwKL P) or all leisure
(otherwise). This would make TA a step-function of the relative
returns from work and leisure (black curves in Fig.1A), an outcome
that is not observed empirically.
However, if work and leisure are imperfect substitutes
({?vsv1 in Eq. (1)), then leisure is preferred more if the
subject has worked more, and vice versa even for deterministic
subjects. The slope of the IC decreases as additional amounts of
leisure are consumed. The optimal combination includes both
rewards (work) and leisure, making TA a smooth function of the
relative returns from work and leisure (blue curves in Fig.2, Eq. (A-
2) in Text S1), as is observed empirically.
Of critical psychological importance is the relationship between
the macroscopic marginal utility of leisure (
LU
Ll
) and the amount of
work so far done. For imperfect substitutability associated with the
utility function of Eq.(1), the former depends on the latter. By
contrast, we show in both deterministic and stochastic settings that
this is not necessary to achieve partial allocation. The possibilities
of non-determinism, which is experimentally ubiquitous, can be
treated in various ways, including traditional random utility
models [16,17].
Normative microscopic approach: Micro SMDP model
Labor supply theory and generalized matching average over the
temporal topography shown in Fig.S1C). By contrast, we follow
[10,18,19] in formulating a so-called micro Semi-Markov Decision
Process (SMDP) [20,21] (Fig. 3A) with actions, states, and utilities,
for which policies (i.e., the stochastic choices of actions at states)
are quantified by the average reward per unit time accrued over
the long run. We formulated the general normative, microscopic
theoretical framework in [10]. Here we delineate a simplified
model pertinent to the partial allocation problem.
Actions and states. Subjects choose what action (a) to do,
and for how long (ta). The longer the duration, the more the
forgone opportunity to collect rewards for other actions they
Figure 1. Indifference curves (ICs) of the labor supply theory
model in Eq.(1). Left: Returns from work exceed those from leisure
(RIwKL P) and right: vice versa (RIvKL P). Solid black lines show the
budget constraint (BC): trial duration T is constant. Open circles show
optimal combination of rewards and leisure for which macroscopic
utility is maximised subject to BC. Dashed black lines denote the path
through theoretically predicted optimal leisure and reward combina-
tions as T is increased. A) perfect substitutability between rewards
(work) and leisure (s~1). Optimal combination is when the subject
works all the time and claims all rewards if RIwKL P, and engage in
leisure all the time otherwise. B) imperfect substitutability (e.g. s~0:25).
Optimal combination comprises non-zero amounts of work and leisure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003894.g001
Figure 2. Time allocation from labor supply theory. TA as a
function of the relative returns from work and leisure predicted by labor
supply theory model in Eq. (1). Black and blue curves show the cases of
perfect (s~1) and imperfect substitutability (sv1), respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003894.g002
Some Work and Some Play
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could instead have been doing during that time. In [10], we
developed a fully detailed model of the example CHT task. This
model was faithful to the task in allowing the subject to choose
the length of each work bout, including distributing leisure
inbetween work bouts prior to attaining the price. Here, however,
in the interests of an analytical treatment of the partial allocation
problem, we model a simplified version of the task in which
subjects are assumed to work for the entire price. In fact, this is
evident in the data (Fig.S1C)), and has been shown to arise from
optimization in the face of stochasticity as we showed in [10]. In
this simplification, there are just two states: s~post- and s~pre-
reward. In the former, the subject consumes leisure (a~L) for a
freely chosen duration tL; then the state becomes pre-reward. If
s~pre, the subject works (a~W ) for the entire price tW~P,
collects a reward and transitions to the post-reward state. The
cycle then repeats.
Utilities. The microscopic utility of the external reward is the
subjective reward intensity RI . The microscopic utility of leisure
CL(:) is innate and assumed to depend on its duration, but not any
other reward or cost, or the amount of work performed. Based on
findings in the case of discrete choices [22–24], we expect aspects
of these utilities to be discernable through neuroscience experi-
ments; one of our main intents is to construct a framework in
which such inferences are precise.
Critically, the assumptions of our microscopic utility function
are different from that of the macroscopic utility function, from
labor supply theory, in Eq.(1), which assumes that when work and
leisure are imperfect substitutes, the macroscopic marginal utility
of leisure (
LU
Ll
) depends on the amount of work performed or the
number of rewards received. In particular, we leave to later work
considerations of fatigue or satiation, both of which can couple the
microscopic utilities for working and engaging in leisure. Note,
however, that this dependence is for the macroscopic utility
function in Eq.(1); other macroscopic utility functions exist in labor
supply that do not necessitate this interaction. In general, labor
supply theory is concerned with the dependence in the marginal
rate of substitution when work and leisure are imperfect
Figure 3. Micro SMDP model, microscopic utilities of leisure and policies. A) The infinite horizon Micro semi-Markov decision process
(Micro-SMDP). States are characterised by whether they are pre- or post-reward. Subjects choose not only whether to work or to engage in leisure,
but also for how long to do so. For simplicity, we assume that a subject pre-commits to working for the entire price duration when it works. Then it
receives a reward of reward intensity RI and transitions to the post-reward state. In the post-reward state, by choosing to engage in leisure for a
duration tL , it gains a microscopic benefit of leisure CL(tL) and then returns to pre-reward state; this cycle repeats. B) Left: canonical microscopic
utility of leisure functions CL(:), right: the marginal microscopic utility of leisure. For simplicity we considered linear CL(:) (blue); whose marginal
utility is constant and concave (here logarithmic) CL(:) (red) whose marginal utility is always decreasing. C) Q-values and policies for engaging in
leisure for low, medium and high payoffs. In upper panels, dashed, dotted and solid curves show: CL(:), AFR and Q-values, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003894.g003
Some Work and Some Play
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substitutes, rather than the macroscopic marginal utilities them-
selves.
The simplest form for CL(t)~KLt is linear (Fig. 3B, left panel
blue line), for which marginal microscopic utility (
LCL(t)
Lt
) is
constant (KL, Fig.3B, right panel, blue line). This makes the total
microscopic utility of several short leisure bouts the same as that of
a single bout of equal total length, and so, just by itself, implies
indifference to the division of the duration of a leisure bout.
Alternatively, CL(t) could be concave (e.g., logarithmic, as in
Fig. 3B, left panel, red curve). The marginal microscopic utility of
leisure would then always decrease as more leisure is consumed
(Fig. 3B, right panel, red curve). Subjects should then prefer
several short leisure bouts to one long leisure bout. Other non-
linear forms are also possible (sigmoidal, quasi concave, see [10]).
A subject’s (possibly stochastic) policy (choice-rule) p is
evaluated according to the average reward rate (rp), which can
be shown to be the ratio of the expected total microscopic utility
accumulated during a cycle to the expected total time a cycle
takes,
rp~
RIzEp CL(tL)½ 
PzEp½tL , ð2Þ
Ep denotes the expected value under the distribution of leisure
durations p(tL) in the post reward-state. The expectation with
respect to the policy p is over a smooth distribution when the
policy is stochastic, or is just a point when the policy is
deterministic (i.e., the policy is a delta function at a particular
leisure duration). The reward-rate increases mostly linearly with
reward intensity and decreases mostly hyperbolically with price.
The terminology in reinforcement learning (RL) [18,21,25] and
optimal foraging [26,27] concerning the average reward rate
differs from that in economics. In RL, rp is considered as the
opportunity cost per unit time under policy p. It provides a point
of comparison in terms of how lucrative the policy is on average.
Committing to performing an action for duration t implies
forgoing a mean total reward of rpt. This would be weighed
against the benefits of the action. By contrast, in economics, the
opportunity cost is defined instead in terms of just the next best
action, a quantity that is not very meaningful in our microscopic
context. To avoid confusion, we refer to rpt as the average
foregone reward (AFR) over period t.
The (differential) Q-value (see Eq. (A-4) in Text S1) is defined as
the expected return of taking action a for time ta from state s,
including the immediate microscopic utility, the AFR and the
differential value of the next state to which the subject transitions.
For engaging in leisure for duration tL in the post-reward state
(using simplified notation), this is
Qp(tL)~CL(tL){r
ptLzV
p(pre) ð3Þ
where Vp(pre) is the differential value of the pre-reward state. Eq.
(3) makes clear the distinction between the immediate, innate
microscopic utility of leisure CL(tL) and the net excess return from
leisure Q(tL). The Q-value of working in the pre-reward state can
be similarly computed (see Eq. (A-5) in Text S1).
Finally, the Q-values are used to determine a policy, i.e., a rule
for choosing leisure duration tL. Instead of adopting a descriptive
explanation for stochasticity in choice, as for instance in random
utility theory, we consider the normative equivalent that starts
from the proposition that subjects have a taste for non-
deterministic policies p(tL). Such a taste is most naturally
quantified in terms of the entropy H(p)~{Ep½log (p(tL)). At
present, this is merely an assumption; its underpinnings demand
careful experimental study. Adopting it makes the problem one of
finding
p(tL)~argmaxp Ep½Q(tL)z 1
b
H(p)
 
~argmaxp
ð
tL
dtLp(tL) Q(tL){
1
b
log (p(tL))
  ð4Þ
where 1=b is a temperature parameter that trades off value for
entropy. The optimum can be found by computing functional
derivatives with respect to p and solving
d
dp
ð
tL
dtLp(tL) Q(tL){
1
b
log (p(tL))
 
~0
[p(tL)! exp bQ(tL)½ 
ð5Þ
Appropriately normalizing Eq. (5), we implement
p(tL)~
exp bQp(tL)½ Ð
tL’[C
exp bQp(tL’)½ dtL’ ð6Þ
where Cv? is the range of possible leisure durations. Durations
with greater Q-values will be more likely to be chosen. The
parameter b[½0,?) controls the degree of stochasticity in choices:
b?? signifies deterministic, optimal choices, while b~0 leads to
complete uniformity (over the range C of possible leisure
durations). Eq.(6) is called a softmax policy; the derivation from
a taste for entropy is well-known [28].
Model policies. As discussed in [10], we can distinguish
various policy regimes. If the payoff is high, then so is the reward
rate; thus the AFR rptL tends to dominate the benefit of leisure
CL(tL) in Eq.(3), no matter what form the latter takes (Fig. 3C,
right panels). The probability of duration tL implied by the soft-
max policy (Eq.(6)) is then the exponential of a nearly linear
function with a steep slope – therefore, an exponential distribution
with a short mean (see Sec. A-3 in Text S1). Thus, the subject
would work almost continuously, with very short, yet stochastic,
exponentially distributed leisure bouts in between work bouts.
At the other extreme, when the payoff is low, the reward rate is
small. Consequently, the AFR has a very shallow slope (Fig. 3C,
left panels). The Q-value of leisure then becomes dominated by the
microscopic utility of leisure CL(:). For a linear CL(:), the Q-value
is still linear, but with a very shallow slope, and the resulting
exponential distribution has a long mean (Fig. 3C, left panel, blue
curves). For an eventually sub-linear CL(:), i.e. the marginal utility
of which is eventually decreasing, the Q-value becomes a
unimodal bump. The exponential of this bump yields a unimodal
gamma(-like) distribution. If CL(:) is concave and its marginal
microscopic utility does not decrease slowly, the exponential of this
bump yields a unimodal gamma(-like) leisure duration distribution
with a long tail (Fig. 3C, left panels, red curves). The leisure
durations are actually gamma distributed for logarithmic CL(:)
(see Sec A-4 in Text S1).
For intermediate payoffs, the AFR has a slope that is neither too
steep nor too shallow (Fig. 3C, middle panels). The Q-value of
leisure depends delicately on the balance between the microscopic
utility of leisure and this intermediate AFR.
Some Work and Some Play
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Partial allocation with independent marginal utilities
Macroscopic utility derived from microscopic
utility. To compare our account with that of labor supply
theory, we construct a macroscopic utility function that is consistent
with the microscopic choices on average. Consider the case that
the subject works for a cumulative amount of time v, thus
completing v=P reward and leisure cycles (we allow these to be
fractional for simplicity), and is at leisure for a cumulative amount
of time l. We seek to derive a macroscopic utility function U(l,v)
from a microscopic utility function U(l,v)~maxpDl,v U(l,v,p)½ ,
such that the ultimately microscopic choices of durations, and the
ultimately macroscopic time allocations are all consistent with the
micro-SMDP that we have derived. Here, the notation pDl,v
indicates that microscopic choices of leisure duration per cycle
have to be consistent with the macroscopic time devoted to leisure
on average, i.e., that
v
P
Ep tL½ ~l ð7Þ
Consider the microscopic utility
U(l,v,p)~
v
P
RIzEp½CL(tL)z 1
b
H(p)
 
z
1
b
g(l,v): ð8Þ
which includes the utilities of the v=P rewards, the expected
microscopic utilities of leisure and the entropy, and a function
1
b
g(l,v), which we will choose to enforce the average foregone
reward. We assume bw 0 so that the derived utilities are finite.
Enforcing Eq. (7) via a Lagrange multiplier
v
P
j, we get
U(l,v,p,j)~
v
P
RIzEp½CL(tL)z 1
b
H(p)zj l
P
v
{Ep½tL
  
z
1
b
g(l,v)
ð9Þ
If we optimise this utility with respect to the policy p, we get
0~
d
dp
ð
tL
dtLp(tL) CL(tL){jtL{
1
b
log (p(tL))
 
[p(tL)! exp b(CL(tL){jtL)½ 
ð10Þ
where the Lagrange multiplier j is chosen to satisfy Eq. (7). At this
optimum, j~r~
RIzEp CL(tL)½ 
PzEp ½tL . That is, the Lagrange
multiplier or, in economic terms, the ‘‘shadow price’’ (marginal
utility of relaxing the constraint in Eq. (7)) is the average reward
rate r. The constructed utility function in Eq. (9) is evaluated at
this optimum, and can now be written in terms of macroscopic
quantities l and v only as
U(l,v)~
v
P
RIzEp ½CL(tL)z 1
b
H(p)
 
z
1
b
g(l,v) ð11Þ
Stochastic microscopic choices. In principle, averaging
over stochastic microscopic choices can lead to partial macro-
scopic time allocation, since the latter concerns the average times
spent. We now derive this graphically and mathematically, from
normative principles. Linear CL(tL)~KLtL is equivalent to the
perfect substitutability case of Eq. (1) with s~1, for which
deterministic choices exclude partial allocation. However, the
derived macroscopic utility in Eq. (11) becomes
U(l,v)~
v
P
RIzKLlz
v
bP
½log (lP=v)z1z 1
b
g(l,v) ð12Þ
Its ICs have negative slopes, which, for stochastic choices
(b 6??), are not constant. These changes in slope generate partial
time allocations (Fig.4A,B), when a budget constraint (BC; solid
black lines) is tangent to an IC. Including an appropriate g(:,:) (Eq.
(A-14) in Text S1) enables the optimal macroscopic combination
of cumulative work and leisure times to be consistent with the
microscopic mean leisure duration. At the optimum,
Ep½tL~lP=v~ P
b(RI{KLP){1
as long as RI{KLP§
1
b
,
and? otherwise (Eqs. (A-9), (A-10) in Text S1). Thus stochasticity
replaces substitutability in generating partial allocation.
For b??, optimal microscopic choices are purely determin-
istic. The derived utility function in Eq.(12) becomes
Figure 4. Microscopic choices yield macroscopic partial
allocation even with independent marginal utilities. To compare
directly with labor supply theory, we derive macroscopic utility
functions consistent with our assumed microscopic utiities. Curves
show indifference curves of the derived macroscopic utility function.
Cool colours show order of increasing macroscopic utility. Solid black
lines show different budget constraints T~vzl as T is changed.
Dashed black line denotes the path through theoretically predicted
optimal leisure and work combinations as T is increased. A), B)
Stochastic, approximately optimal microscopic choices with linear CL(:)
yields partial allocation (A) high and B) medium payoffs are shown).
Inverse temperature b~1. C) Deterministic, optimal microscopic
choices with linear CL(:) yield all-or-none allocation–work all the time
if RIwKLP. Inverse temperature b??. CL(tL)~0:7tL, Reward
intensity, RI~9 in A), RI~4:3 in B) and C), price P~4s in A-C. D)
Deterministic, optimal choices with non-linear CL(:) also yields partial
allocation. CL(tL)~0:7 log (tL), b??, RI~2:46 and price P~4s.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003894.g004
Some Work and Some Play
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U(l,v)~
v
P
RIzKLl ð13Þ
which directly corresponds to the utility function of labor supply
theory in Eq.(1) with s~1 and would lead to total allocation to
work or leisure depending on whether work or leisure is more
beneficial, i.e. the sign of RI{KLP (Fig. 4C; compare with Fig. 1,
upper- panels).
Deterministic, optimal microscopic choices. As for
standard labor supply theory, the assumption of stochasticity
is not necessary to achieve partial allocation if the microscopic
utility of leisure is a suitably non-linear function of its duration,
e.g., the concave CL(tL)~(k{1) log (tL), for kw1 (Fig. 3B,
red). Choosing concave CL(:) is for convenience; it would
further be straightforward to take CL(tL)~(k{1) log (tLz1)
so that the microscopic utility is defined over all tL§0.
Importantly, though, the microscopic marginal utility of leisure
need not depend on the amount of work done. For a
deterministic policy (b??), the derived macroscopic utility
function (see Eq. (A-16) in Text S1)is
U(l,v)~
v
P
RIz(k{1) log lP=vð Þ½  ð14Þ
for which the slopes of the (macroscopic) ICs depend on the
amount of work and leisure accumulated (Fig. 4D) and
generate partial allocation as optimal solutions. Thus, neither
stochasticity nor an interaction between work and the marginal
utility of leisure is necessary for partial allocation.
Traditional macroscopic accounts: II
Generalized matching law: Mountain model. An alter-
nate macroscopic characterisation of behavior that yields smooth
time allocation curves, hypothesises that subjects match (according
to the generalised matching law, [4,29]) their time allocation
between work and leisure to the ratio of their payoffs [29], RW and
RL~
RImax
PL
, respectively [2,30]
v
l
~
RW
RL
 a
[
v
vzl
~TA~
RW
a
RW
azRL
a~
RIa
RIaz(
P
PL
)a
:
ð15Þ
Here, PL is defined as the price at which, for a maximum
subjective reward intensity RImax, the subject allocates half the
time to work, and half to leisure (see red lines in Figs.5 and
S2A).
This establishes a 3-dimensional relationship between TA,
subjective reward intensity and price (Fig.5, left panel) that is
analogous to the mountain model [12,31]), which plots this
relationship in terms of the objective reward strength. TA is
smooth, and increases and decreases monotonically with reward
intensity and price, respectively, as evident in the contours in
Fig. 5 (right panel). Stochastic macroscopic allocation, by virtue of
generalised matching, therefore accounts for partial time alloca-
tion. The matching coefficient a determines how TA increases as a
function of the payoff from work – rapidly for over-matching
(aw1), and slowly for under-matching ((av1), Fig. S2B, respec-
tively).
The microscopic mountain
By integrating the microscopic choices from our model, we can
compare it with macroscopic descriptions such as the mountain
model. We saw that linear CL(:) generates partial allocation with
stochasticity. It therefore generates smooth (non-step function)
macroscopic time allocation curves as a function of both reward
intensity and price. Consequently, 3-dimensional relationships can
be derived that are qualitatively similar to those specified by the
mountain model (when expressed in terms of subjective reward
intensity, compare Fig. 6A with Fig. 5).
However, when CL(:) is non-linear, more complicated struc-
tures arise. If the price is increased while holding the reward
intensity fixed, the reward rate rp (Eq. (2)) decreases hyperbolically
and eventually asymptotes (Fig.7A). Consequently, unlike the
mean, the mode of the gamma-like distribution does not
substantially increase with the price (see Figs.3C and 7B). Since
the mode determines the duration of the majority of leisure bouts,
these do not increase substantially. If the subject continues to work
for the entire price duration (Fig.7C), then, surprisingly from the
macroscopic perspective of the generalized matching model, the
total work time and thus the TA will increase, rather than decrease
with the price (Figs.6B and 7A, lower panel). This prediction is
readily amenable to experimental test.
Since for linear CL(:), leisure durations are governed by
substantially changing means and not modes, TAs are in general
smaller than for strictly concave CL(:), implying that higher
payoffs are necessary to capture the entire TA range.
Discussion
We studied the problem of partial time allocation – when
reward intensities and prices are not extreme, both animals and
humans divide their time between work and leisure. Traditional
theories such as the microeconomic theory of labor supply, or
accounts from behavioral psychology based on the generalised
matching law, have characterised behavior at a macroscopic level,
studying average times spent in work or leisure. While labor supply
approaches have studied choices within periods of time, these have
been limited to maximising utility within these time windows [32]–
and thus, still average times within these windows. We proposed a
normative, microscopic approach using the reinforcement learning
framework of Semi-Markov Decision Processes. Although we
Figure 5. Mountain model. Left panel: 3-dimensional relationship;
right panel: contours of equal time allocation, as a function of reward
intensity and price predicted by the mountain model using the
generalised matching law. Red lines in right panel show PL: the price at
which TA~0:5 for a maximal reward intensity (red dot in left panel).
a~2:65,PL~11:4s. The TA contours smoothly increase with reward
intensity and smoothly decrease with price.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003894.g005
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applied it to the labor-leisure tradeoff, this is actually a more
general theoretical framework for temporally relevant decision-
making. By integrating the microscopic choices of our model over
time, we were able to account for the nature of macroscopic partial
allocation.
We showed how assumptions about microscopic and macro-
scopic quantities relate. In labor supply theory, the marginal
utility of leisure may (although not necessarily) depend on the
amount of work (or rewards) consumed, and (unlike in the
behavioral data) choices are classically deterministic. We consid-
ered a stochastic policy of the same form as emerges for standard
random utility models, but directed at microscopic, rather than
macroscopic, choices. Macroscopic random utility theory consid-
ers stochasticity to be due to unobservable noise, which is added
to the representation of utility. The subject chooses the
combination of cumulative work and leisure times that maximizes
this net utility (including the noise term). If the noise is assumed to
be Gumbel distributed (i.e. drawn from an extreme value
distribution of type I), then the probability of choosing the
optimal combination is a softmax. The softmax function that we
employ is over microscopic durations, and arises from an
(equivalently arbitrary) assumption that subjects have a taste for
entropic policies. Randomness is thus directly built into the fabric
of our model, rather than being an afterthought. It generates
partial allocation even when the marginal microscopic utility of
leisure is independent of work.
Previous exercises attempting to link macroscopic static and
dynamic frameworks have not been generally successful [9].
Optimal choice in a dynamic context generally depends on the
microscopic state, whose evolution is invisible at a macroscopic
level. This allows the macroscopic average choice obtained after
integrating out such states (i.e., the average choice under the
stationary distribution) to appear counterintuitive, possibly even
violating rationality constraints. In our case, the key feature of the
microscopic state is implicit in the non-memorylessness of the
policies allowed in an SMDP – e.g., that the hazard function
governing the probability a leisure bout will end a certain time
after it begun is not independent of time.
An example of the problems comes from observing that time
allocation to working under conventional macroscopic labor
supply accounts generally increases with reward and decreases
with price. Something similar is true of the macroscopic,
mountain-like, consequence of generalized matching. We showed
in our framework that, although this can be true, it is nevertheless
the case that for certain non-linearities, the time allocated to
working can increase rather than decrease as the price increases,
yielding complicated 3-dimensional relationships and non-mono-
tonic contours that elude the mountain model. We thus derived a
transparent link between microscopic and macroscopic frame-
works. Whereas animals have been previously shown consistently
to work more when work-requirements are greater (one idea is that
this arises from sunk costs [33,34]), the apparent anomaly
discussed here only occurs at longer prices and is due to the form
of the microscopic utility of leisure. This is an obvious candidate
for empirical investigation [35].
Non-linear benefit of leisure functions can also lead to partial
allocation for deterministic choices. This applies even for functions
that differ from those common in labor supply theory in virtue of
satisfying independence between the microscopic utilities of
working and engaging in leisure. Of course, the marginal
microscopic utility of leisure might depend on work or rewards –
for instance due to fatigue or satiation. However, carefully
eliminating such dependencies (by, e.g., allowing subjects sufficient
rest inbetween trials, and using non-satiating rewards like BSR)
may provide an avenue to quantify aspects of the microscopic
utility of leisure empirically. This should help reveal why and how
subjects partially allocate their time. It would then be natural to
extend the study to considerations of effort, fatigue and cognitive
computational costs [36–40] (e.g. from holding down weighted
levers or performing cognitively demanding tasks) and the effects
of manipulating motivational state [12,41,42]. It is by taking
advantage of the greater precision available from the detailed
topography of work and leisure that we may hope to gain insight
into these most important details. Although previous work has
described aspects of this topography [37,43], our precise control
theoretic formalization could offer enrichment.
The utilities considered in macroscopic labor supply theory are
ordinal, whereas the microscopic utilities used in our framework
are cardinal and, by analogy with quantities investigated in
discrete choice paradigms [22–24], open for direct neural
investigation. One of the key goals of our work is to provide a
formal framework within which this can happen.
Finally, our work provides a foundation for studying critical
psychological processes and neural computations at an appropri-
ate timescale. Real-time or quasi-real-time recording methods in
routine use in neuroscience such as electrophysiology, large-scale
imaging, or fast-scan cyclic voltammetry allow us to correlate the
activity of neural populations or concentrations of neuromodula-
tors with the execution of behaviors. Likewise, fast causal
manipulations via such methods as optogenetics allow the circuits
Figure 6. Macroscopic time allocation derived from normative,
microscopic choices yields a superset of the mountain model.
Left panels: 3-dimensional relationships between TA, reward intensity
and price, right panel: contours of equal TA, predicted by the micro
SMDP model for A) linear, B) concave CL(:). The 3-dimensional
relationship and smooth contours for a linear CL(:) derive the mountain
model in Fig.3. Note that an extra, higher set of reward intensities was
necessary to achieve the full range of time allocation for linear CL(:).
The fact that contours change direction at longer prices for a non-linear
CL(:) rather than decrease monotonically reflects that TA may no longer
decrease and even increase as the price is increased further.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003894.g006
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governing these behaviors to be probed in a highly selective
manner. There is an evident mismatch between the microscopic
timescale over which these methods operate and the macroscopic
timescales over which (a) behavior has often been characterised;
and (b) the quantities such as costs and benefits which underpin
the pertinence of the behavior have been defined. Our normative
microscopic account may therefore provide an illuminating
framework within which to build explanations that span multiple
levels.
Methods
See Micro-SMDP methods in Text S1.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Partial time allocation: example task and
data. A) Cumulative handling time (CHT) task. Grey bars
denote work (e.g. holding down a lever), white gaps show leisure
(eg. grooming, resting, sleeping etc.). The subject must accumu-
late work up to a total period of time called the price (P) in order
to obtain a single reward (black dot) of subjective reward intensity
RI . The trial duration is 25|price. The reward intensity and
price are held fixed within a trial. B) Macroscopic time allocation
(TA) functions of a typical subject as a function of reward
intensity and price. Red curves: effect of reward intensity, for a
fixed short price; blue curves: effect of price, for a fixed high
reward intensity; green curves: joint effect of reward intensity and
price. C) Microscopic ethogram showing the detailed temporal
topography of working and engaging in leisure for the subject in
B) for a medium payoff respectively, for a fixed, short price. The
part of a trial before the reward and price are certainly known is
coloured pink and not considered further. Data initially reported
in [13,44].
(TIF)
Figure S2 Mountain model parameters. Left 3-dimension-
al relationship; right panel: contours of equal time allocation, as a
function of reward intensity and price predicted by the mountain
model using the generalised matching law. Red lines in right
panels show PL: the price at which TA~0:5 for a maximal reward
intensity (red dot in left panels). A) For a small PL~2:85s, while
Figure 7. Time allocation may not decrease with price for a non-linear microscopic utility of leisure. A) Upper panel: Reward rate (rp)
and lower panel: time allocation (TA) for a concave microscopic utility of leisure as a function of price. A small and a high reward intensity are shown.
Reward rate decreases hyperbolically with price, eventually asymptoting. B) Leisure duration distribution as a function of price for a fixed high reward
intensity (RI~6). At very long prices, as the price is increased further (eg. from 30 s to 50 s), the mode of the leisure duration distribution does not
change by much although the mean does. C) Ethograms for two long prices. As price is increased, the work bouts (proportional to the price) do
increase. Leisure bouts, drawn from the mode, do not change by much. Consequently, TA no longer decreases but may even increase with price (A,
lower panel). This is despite the trial duration being normalised to a multiple (here 25) of the price. It is the lack of significant change in the majority
of leisure durations that is critical. We normalised by the trial duration of 25| price, instead of simply normalizing by the price, to emphasise that TA
is a macroscopic quantitity and to be consistent with the procedure in the example data Figure S1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003894.g007
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overmatching a~2:65w1 as in the main text and B) under-
matching a~0:66v1 while PL~11:4s as in the main text.
(TIF)
Text S1 Supporting information.
(PDF)
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